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Vulture Funds and the Fresh Start Accounting Value of Firms Emerging 
from Bankruptcy 
 
Abstract: 
We study how distress-oriented hedge funds (vulture funds) play an important role in the fresh 
start valuation of firms emerging from Chapter 11 reorganization.  We find that loan-to-own 
vultures acquire debt positions of the distressed firm that grant dominant power in the 
bankruptcy negotiations, and they then use the discretion allowed by fresh start accounting to 
introduce valuation bias in their favor. We show that the strategic influence over fresh start 
values can create opportunities to increase vulture investors’ returns at the expense of other 
claim holders.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: distress, bankruptcy, valuation, hedge fund, reporting discretion. 
JEL: G14, G23, G33, M41 
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Vulture Funds and the Fresh Start Accounting Value of Firms Emerging 
from Bankruptcy 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Active hedge funds have an important role in the resolution of Chapter 11 bankruptcies. 
They can influence the reorganization negotiations and shift control rights in their favor 
(Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997; Kahan and Rock, 2009; Jiang et al., 2012; Lim, 2015; 
Ivashina et al., 2016). However, how distress-oriented hedge funds achieve that influence is 
unclear. While finance research underlines the positive effects of hedge fund involvement (e.g., 
quick recovery from bankruptcy, greater debt reduction, and more efficient contracting, Lim, 
2015), legal studies argue that distressed-oriented hedge funds (known as vulture funds) obtain 
excessive control at the expense of other stakeholders (Baird and Rasmussen, 2010; Harner, 
2011; Harner et al., 2014). We focus on vulture funds that pursue a loan-to-own strategy in 
which the fund purchases distressed debt with the intention of converting it into equity of the 
emerging firm; we add to this debate by showing a particular accounting mechanism that 
vulture investors are likely to use to preferentially influence the value of the firm at emergence 
from Chapter 11: fresh start accounting (FS) valuation. The FS value is important for the 
allocation of rights because it determines the value of the new firm to be divided among various 
stakeholders. The estimate of FS value affects the bankruptcy negotiations on the amounts and 
form (i.e., cash, new debt, or new equity) of the distributions to the claimants, which in turn 
determines the approval of the reorganization plan by the court and ultimately the success of 
the reorganization. 
Fresh start accounting rules require that all assets of the reorganized firm are measured 
based on estimates of fair value, and recorded as opening balances in the firm’s financial 
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statements upon emergence from Chapter 11.1 Because most assets are not actively traded in 
liquid markets (e.g., intangible assets, property) their fair values are based on forecasts rather 
than on arm’s-length transactions which gives rise to considerable reporting discretion. The 
forecasts of fresh start values are produced by management with the help of experts, and as a 
result, incorporate managers’ private information and the interests of influential claimants 
(Franks and Torous, 1989; Gilson et al., 2000; Lehavy, 2002). Thus, the discretion facilitated 
by FS accounting rules opens the possibility for influence over valuation by claimants with a 
significant say over the restructuring process. 
Vulture funds can obtain that significant influence by acquiring a critical position in the 
debt structure of the distressed firm: the fulcrum debt. The fulcrum is the point in the firm’s 
capital structure at which the value of the firm on exiting bankruptcy first fails to cover 
outstanding claims (Moyer et al., 2012). Fulcrum creditors have maximum voting power in the 
reorganization plan that defines the fresh start accounting value of the firm. The reason for this 
power is that while the most senior (unimpaired) creditors are paid in full and hence their 
approval of the plan is automatic, the intermediate fulcrum creditors which are only partially 
paid have a presumptive right to the equity of the newly organized firm. Any claims junior to 
the fulcrum get little or nothing in the new firm and so it is assumed they will reject the plan, 
making their vote unnecessary. Thus the vote of the fulcrum creditors is the only one that 
matters.  
However, the exact fulcrum point is not known until the final reorganization plan is 
approved by the court. This uncertainty gives vulture investors incentives to influence the FS 
                                                            
1 The fresh start accounting rules are defined in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Accounting 
Standards Codification Topic 852. Under the rules, firms emerging from Chapter 11 are required to estimate and 
report the fair values of assets and liabilities of the reorganized entity. The amounts of the assets and liabilities of 
the predecessor firm are set to zero and the new fair values (i.e. fresh start values) are reported in the successor’s 
accounts. For a comprehensive example of fresh start accounting see Lehavy and Udpa (2011). 
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valuations so that the final value of the firm guarantees them increased control rights at exit 
from bankruptcy. For example, if their claim is of relatively high seniority and the FS value is 
too high, they will only receive the honoring of the claim with no opportunity to convert it into 
equity. Thus, we argue that a vulture fund acquiring a relatively high seniority claim has a 
strong preference for lower FS values because the lower priority debtors then receive little or 
no share in the equity of the emerging firm, while the vulture fund ends up with a larger 
proportion of the equity. If in fact the firm value is significantly higher a short time after 
bankruptcy than the FS value on the date of exit from bankruptcy, there is a potential windfall 
for the owners of the emerging firm. An immediate consequence of this strategic influence over 
FS value is the cancellation of the interests of the original shareholders and junior debtholders. 
On the other hand, if vulture funds acquire debt of relatively low seniority, they will favor 
higher FS valuations to avoid the risk of extinguishing the claim and to ensure that it is partially 
rather than fully impaired. The case of Visteon which filed for Chapter 11 in May 2009 
illustrates how vultures can strategically interfere with FS valuation. Some vulture investors 
bought a large portion of unsecured junior debt with almost zero recovery value in the initial 
reorganization plan. They voted against the initial plan and the court had to overrule it. The 
plan was amended five times, and the estimated FS value changed from about $1 billion to 
about $2.5 billion in the final plan approved in October 2010. The emerging value of the firm 
granted vulture investors 16% ownership in the firm. Three months later, Visteon’s market 
value jumped to about $3.5 billion.  
We empirically test our conjectures for a hand-collected sample of Chapter 11 firms, in 
the period between 1994 and 2011. We start by comparing the FS value of the firm’s assets at 
exit from Chapter 11 bankruptcy (ve) with the value of assets at filing for bankruptcy (vf). We 
find that when vulture funds enter the capital structure of the target firm at relatively high 
seniority positions, the firm experiences a downward FS valuation in 67% of cases (i.e., ve - vf 
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< 0). In contrast, when vulture investors hold low seniority claims, 95% of the firms exit 
bankruptcy with upward FS valuation (i.e., ve - vf > 0). The upward (downward) FS valuation 
is mostly achieved through the increase of the fair value of intangible assets (i.e. decrease of 
fair value of property, plant and equipment).  We also document the FS misvaluation at 
emergence date measured as the difference between the FS value of assets and the market value 
of the firm (ve – vm,e). We find that the fresh start value is understated by 5.5% on average 
relatively to the market value. More importantly, the FSmisvaluation significantly increases 
(i.e., the understatement is grater) with the presence of vulture fund investors. The multivariate 
analysis that controls for other factors affecting vulture funds’ investment decisions confirms 
the significant relations between the debt positions held by vulture funds during bankruptcy and 
the over or under valuation of the firm at exit from bankruptcy.  
Vulture funds must ensure cooperation from management to exert influence over FS 
valuation. The estimations of the fresh start value of assets are typically made by experts but 
managers retains substantial involvement in valuations because they possess better knowledge 
about the true value of the assets and they remain in control of the firm’s operations (Franks 
and Torous, 1989; Wruck, 1990; Lehavy, 2002). Creditors on the other hand, have little external 
information about the value of business and its future prospects, and consequently rely on 
management estimates as the basis to negotiate the fresh start value of the firm (Gilson et al., 
2000). Vulture funds are known for actively controlling management and the board, and often 
take the role of CEO or chairman of the distressed firm (Hotckiss and Mooradian, 1997; Kahan 
and Rock, 2009). Managers have incentives to cooperate with active vultures to avoid the 
stigma of being associated with long or unsuccessful reorganizations and to increase the 
probability of keeping their managerial positions (Brav et al., 2008; Bharat et al., 2014). If the 
loan-to-own debtholders end up with significant equity interests in the newly restructured firm 
as our findings suggest, they will have great influence in the reappointment and remuneration 
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of management ex-post the bankruptcy. Alignment with the interests of fulcrum creditors can 
also bring management benefits during bankruptcy. Often senior managers experience a 
considerable reduction in wealth as their (low priority) equity share in the distressed firm is 
cancelled under the FS valuation rules. This wealth loss can be compensated by pay-to-stay 
remuneration plans offered by fulcrum creditors who are the key voting party in the 
reorganization. The compensation plans (key employee retention plans or KERP’s), and other 
incentives) offer managers generous salaries to stay in the job and steer the firm out of Chapter 
11,  which incentivizes managers to produce creditor friendly valuations (Bharat et al., 2014). 
We provide evidence that the amount of management compensation during bankruptcy is four 
times higher in firms with vulture fund involvement. Further, we find that, in the presence of 
vulture funds, management compensation is lower when there is a high competition for 
management attention (proxied by the number of voting classes), an indication that vultures 
have less scope for alignment of management interests with their own when they have relatively 
less bargaining power in the negotiations.We perform several additional tests. First, we observe 
the market value of the firm 12 months after bankruptcy and compare it with the FS value of 
the firm at emergence. A-priori, when a Chapter 11 firm emerges from bankruptcy, it is no 
surprise if the market value increases rapidly. However what would be surprising is to 
systematically observe inconsistency between the FS value estimated by management and the 
actual market value soon after bankruptcy. Valuation inconsistency arises when large 
downward FS valuations are systematically followed by large increases in subsequent market 
values. This reversal in firm value (which we refer to as whiplash) suggests FS valuation bias. 
We find increasing levels of such reversals when vulture funds hold fulcrum claims. 
Considering that vulture investors usually purchase debt of troubled firms at a large discount 
(given the uncertainty of Chapter 11 and the lack of liquidity, creditors prefer to sell cheap than 
to risk receiving nothing in the new firm, Ivashina et al., 2016), the reversal in market values 
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can give vultures the opportunity to earn large ex-post returns by trading the stock or selling 
the firm’s assets at higher market prices.  
Second, we examine the relation between vulture funds loan-to-own strategies and the 
likelihood of post-bankruptcy accounting restatements. If the undue influence of vulture funds 
is reflected in the reported FS values, we expect that a firm is more likely to formally restate 
previously filed accounting statements. We find that the probability of reporting an accounting 
restatement related with asset measurement in the year after bankruptcy is 28% higher when 
vulture funds hold high-intermediate seniority claims.  
Vulture funds are not the only party whose interests are at stake in the restructuring 
process, so why do other stakeholders not pursue a similar loan-to-own strategy? Put simply, 
other parties lack the incentives and the means of vulture fund investors. Banks prefer a loan-
to-loan strategy because they have incentives to strengthen the seniority and security of their 
existing loans and to provide debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing (Heron et al., 2009; Ivashina 
et al., 2016; Li and Wang, 2016). Banks are also burdened by capital requirements which reduce 
opportunities for high-risk Chapter 11 investments. Other institutional investors, such as 
pension and mutual funds, are constrained by regulatory and structural barriers which exclude 
them from distress investment strategies (Brav et al., 2008). For example, mutual funds are 
precluded from holding large percentage stakes in individual companies, and pension funds are 
subject to heightened fiduciary standards and to extensive state controls. Unlike vulture funds, 
both mutual and pension funds fall under the SEC’s Investment Company Act 1940 which 
greatly limits their flexibility in trading. Other types of funds, such as private equity and venture 
capital funds, focus on private investments. In terms of replicability of the vulture fund’s 
strategy, there is a first mover advantage for the first agents (timely vulture funds) that purchase 
the fulcrum debt. As most of the debt trades during bankruptcy are private and lack market 
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oversight (e.g. low liquidity and analyst following), identifying potential sellers and negotiating 
privately to buy their claims requires specialist information and skills that other agents do not 
have (Gilson et al., 2000; Ivashina et al., 2016). In sum, vulture investors hire highly 
incentivized fund managers who invest large sums of money in risky strategies (Gilson, 1995; 
Brav et al., 2008), they are not burdened by demanding reporting requirements and regulatory 
oversight (Harner, 2011), and they are capable of taking control over management and the board 
of the distressed investment (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997; Li and Wang 2016). 
 Our findings contribute to understanding how important claimholders are able to 
influence the value of firms that emerge from court-supervised bankruptcy. We discuss and 
provide empirical evidence that the discretion allowed by fresh start accounting offer fulcrum 
claimants’ opportunities to introduce valuation bias. We show that management compensation 
is one channel that fulcrum vulture funds may use to bias values during the negotiations in the 
desired direction. Our findings also add to the extensive literature on management desire to 
manipulate accounting values. A growing literature typified by Gwilliam and Jackson (2008) 
argues that attempts to move to market-based valuation have not prevented management or 
other interested parties from introducing bias in valuation. In the absence of liquid market prices 
for assets of Chapter 11 firms, the estimation of fair values based on forecasts potentially 
introduces error and management discretion (e.g. Dietrich et al., 2000). Our evidence suggest 
that relying on the assertion that fresh start accounting values are based on fair values estimated 
by independent experts and hence free of bias is problematic especially when interested parties 
have strategic reasons for bias. Finally, our study also adds to the debate on the nature and 
effects of hedge fund activism in Chapter 11 cases. We draw on the findings by Jiang et al. 
(2012), Ivashina et al. (2016), Li and Wang (2016) and others and explain how vulture funds 
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can position themselves to exploit the unique features of FS valuation to influence the “size of 
the pie” allocated to various claimants.  
  The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The following section describes the sample 
and data. Section 3 discusses the methodological approach and Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. SAMPLE AND DATA 
2.1 SAMPLE  
To identify the firms using fresh start accounting, we start with the complete UCLA-LoPucki 
Bankruptcy Research Database of firms that filed under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.2 This sample comprises 920 companies over the period 1980 to 2011. We 
exclude firms that are liquidated in Chapter 7, firms that emerged from bankruptcy prior to 
19943, and firms not included in Compustat, Capital IQ and CRSP, and we end up with 375 
firms. From this sample, we removed cases where the court approved the sale of all or almost 
all of the assets, thus resulting in a sample of 337 companies. The LoPucki database registers 
if the company made a fresh start filing in the field “FreshStartAccounting”. For the sample of 
337 firms, we find “yes” in the field for 77 companies and “no” for 16 companies, leaving 244 
companies unclassified. For the 244 unclassified firms, we search all the companies’ filings in 
the SEC EDGAR database for the phrase “Fresh Start” around the date of emergence. If we do 
not find the phrase, then we exclude the company. If we do find the phrase, we search through 
                                                            
2 The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database includes firms with assets worth $100 million or more 
measured in 1980 dollars as of the last 10-K filing immediately prior to filing for bankruptcy; and filed a 10-K 
for the year ending not less than 3 years prior to the bankruptcy filing. 
3 In order to collect fresh start accounts, we need to be able to search the SEC EDGAR database which only 
records companies back to 1994. 
11 
 
all the SEC filings and collect the associated FS accounts. We then eliminate cases for which 
we do not have the necessary financial and market data, resulting in a final sample of 127 firms 
that went through Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 1994 and 2011. For this sample we read all 
the fresh start accounts and manually collect the asset value of the firm at filing of bankruptcy 
(predecessor firm) and at exit from bankruptcy (the successor firm). The difference between 
the two values is the fresh start (re) valuation. 
 
2.2 IDENTIFYING THE PRESENCE AND STRATEGY OF VULTURE FUNDS IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
There is no database identifying vulture fund investors, thus we construct a unique list by 
combining the Altman and Kuehne (2011) classification of 324 funds with the list of 258 
distressed debt funds provided by Distressed-Debt-Investing.com. We obtain a list of 399 
vulture fund investors.4  
The next step is to identify the presence of any of the 399 vulture funds in the sample 
firms and their loan-to-own strategy. To implement the strategy, the fund needs to acquire the 
class of debt that is fulcrum. However, observing the holdings of debt claims is difficult because 
there are no public records of trades during bankruptcy. Most deals are negotiated privately and 
recorded in court-sealed documents which are not tracked by one central registry or entity. 
Further, even with access to the court documents it is difficult to obtain information on the 
original holders because many of them are hidden behind Depository Trusts that act as 
custodians of the original holders (Ivashina et al. 2016).5 We overcome this limitation by 
                                                            
4 Of the 75 additional vulture funds identified, 45 have names similar to those in the Altman classification. For 
instance, Cerebrus Capital Management LP and Cerebus Partners are both identified as vulture funds and so we 
treat them as one. But we note that the potential double counting of funds with similar names does not affect our 
results because our statistical tests look at the total holdings of all vulture funds from the list, not the number of 
vulture funds with a holding. The list of vulture funds is available from the authors upon request.  
5 To our knowledge, the only systematic evidence on the trading of claims during Chapter 11 is provided by 
Ivashina et al. (2016) who are able to obtain information from court documents at two points in time: at entry 
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implementing the following procedure. First, we identify the fulcrum class of debt for each 
firm. We obtain reorganization plans provided by BankruptcyData.com which lists the classes 
of claims that are honored (unimpaired), the classes cancelled in full (impaired), and the classes 
partially impaired (the fulcrum debt). The reorganization plans provide information about the 
type and the relative seniority of the classes, but they do not identify their holders. Second, we 
conduct extensive news searches in Factiva to establish whether any of the 399 vulture funds 
has acquired the identified fulcrum security of a particular firm. We search using the following 
combination of key words: (1) firm name (2) vulture fund name and (3) the description of the 
fulcrum class obtained from the reorganization plans (e.g., “Class 4 senior notes claims”, 
“Secured class 3 debt”, “Class 7 impaired unsecured junior claims”). The process of manual 
searching and reading through Factiva documents also helps us understand the reorganization 
setting of each firm.  For example, we are able to identify who the other important players are, 
banks and funds for example, and whether there are disputes amongst various claimants. Third, 
we check whether the debt class held by a vulture fund is indeed swapped for equity on exit 
from Chapter 11. We do this by searching SEC filings 13D, 13D/A, 13G, 13G/A, 13F, 10K, 
and 8K for each firm over the period from six months before the bankruptcy filing to six months 
after emergence from bankruptcy.6 From these filings, we collect equity ownership by vulture 
funds and by other important claimants, on the dates of entry and exit from bankruptcy. Based 
on this analysis, we group vulture funds (VF) into two types: (1) VF that purchased unsecured 
                                                            
and close to exit of chapter11. They show that active investors are the main buyers of distress debt during 
bankruptcy, and that they hold a significant portion of claims by the time votes are made on the final plan of 
reorganization. 
6 Investors are required to file with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring more than 5% of any class of securities 
of a publicly traded company. Investors should file schedule 13D filings (active investors) or 13G filing (passive 
investors).  Form 13F filings require all institutions that have investment discretion over a minimum of $100 
million in Section 13(f) securities of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose their quarter-end holdings in these 
securities. If the investor receives more than 5% equity interest in the reorganized firm over the course of 
Chapter 11 restructuring, then the original debt positions that vest the fund with such equity ownership is 
recorded in “Item 3: Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration” of the 13D form. 
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junior claims of a relatively low seniority which we call VF holding Low-Intermediate Seniority 
claims, and (2) VF that purchased secured or more senior classes of claims which we call VF 
holding High-Intermediate Seniority claims. 
Since the precise fulcrum point is not known until the reorganization plan is approved 
by the court, the low-intermediate seniority claims are likely to be positioned below the 
fulcrum point while the high-intermediate seniority claims are expected to be positioned 
above the fulcrum point. Thus, we predict that vulture funds are likely actively involved 
in negotiating the fresh value of the firm, and that this negotiation is related, at least 
partially, with the relative position of their claims in the debt structure of the firm. (see 
Figure 1 for graphical interpretation). In particular we anticipate that, on average: (a) 
VF holding low-intermediate seniority claims welcome upward FS valuations; and (b) 
VF hold high-intermediate seniority claims favor downward FS valuations. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Vulture funds are sophisticated investors that can select the Chapter 11 firms that best serve 
their interests and hence their targets are probably not random, but result from a deliberate 
choice correlated with unobservable conditions. To address the potential endogeneity in vulture 
investment decisions we fit the following two-stage treatment model:7 
 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠௜ ൌ 𝑋௜𝛽 ൅ 𝑉𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦௜𝛿 ൅ 𝜀௜,      
𝑉𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦௜ ൌ ൜1,      𝑖𝑓 𝑍௜𝛾 ൅ 𝜇௜ ൐ 00,               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒          (1) 
                                                            
7 The model is as described in Wooldridge (2002, section 15.7.3), Guo and Fraser (2009, section 4) and is 
implemented in the hedge fund literature (e.g. Jiang et al., 2012; Lim, 2015). 
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The left-hand-side variable in the second stage equation is the measure of the fresh start 
(FS) valuation bias which we compute in two ways. The first (FSrevaluation) is an accounting-
based measure calculated as the difference between the successor firm FS value of assets at 
Chapter 11 exit (ve) and the predecessor firm value of assets at Chapter 11 entry (vf), scaled by 
the book value of equity plus book value of debt after emergence. FSrevaluation takes into 
account that the predecessor value is an unbiased firm value known to vultures at bankruptcy 
entry point at which they decide how to negotiate valuation to turn their claim into a fulcrum 
security. In other words, based on the observed predecessor value vultures are likely to bias 
asset valuations during the negotiations in the desired direction so that a reached successor 
value ensures that their debt claims are swapped for equity. The second measure 
(FSmisvaluation) compares the FS value of assets at bankruptcy exit (ve) with the market value 
of the assets at that date (𝑣௠,௘). This measure has been used in other chapter 11 studies and has 
the advantage of comparing firm values at the same point in time (e.g. Lehavy, 2002; Gilson et 
al., 2000). Using the market value to compute the valuation bias implicitly assumes that market 
value represents an unbiased estimate of the firm’s intrinsic value at exit date. That assumption 
has limitations  because many firms do not trade immediately after bankruptcy or trade only 
over the counter; while those that do trade suffer from asymmetries of information due to low 
liquidity and low analyst coverage (e.g. Li and Zhong 2013; Eberhart et al. 1999). Furthermore, 
the first day of trading is difficult to track and consequently poorly recorded by commercial 
databases such as CRSP8.  
                                                            
8 Most stocks of reorganized firms do not trade immediately after emergence date, and when trading begins it is 
usually only in OTC markets and thus not recorded by CRSP. Additionally the identification of the first day of 
trading is not obvious because it varies with the particular characteristics of the new and old stock such as 
whether the new shares trade under the old name or a new name, or whether the old shares are fully cancelled or 
continue to trade. 
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The key right-hand-side variable of interest is VFStrategy which takes two alternative 
definitions reflecting the two strategies explained in Section 2.2: (1) VF LowISeniority claims 
which equals one when vulture funds hold low-intermediate seniority debt claims, and zero 
otherwise; and (2) VF HighISeniority claims which takes the value of one when vulture funds 
hold high-intermediate seniority debt claims and zero otherwise.  
The set of explanatory variables included in Vector Xi are selected following prior 
literature on vulture fund participation in bankruptcy outcomes. Vector Zi includes variables 
that are common to vector Xi in the second stage equation, plus two instruments: HF distress 
return and Bond return.  HF distress return is the monthly average return over the three months 
before bankruptcy of an index of distress-investing hedge fund return and represents the supply 
conditions of hedge fund distress-investors (Jiang et al., 2012). Bond return is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the three-month average bond return of S&P500 firms before 
bankruptcy is positive and zero if it is negative. The variable captures the good and bad 
conditions in public debt markets which are likely to be associated with the supply-demand 
dynamics of the distressed claims.9.  
To choose the explanatory variables (overlapping in vectors Xi and Zi), we address two 
questions. How do vulture investors decide their investment strategy? Which incentives of 
vulture funds and other players are likely to affect the outcome of the restructuring?  Vultures 
typically consider whether the firm is economically healthy or the problem lies with the firm’s 
business model. We include Operating performance pre-bankruptcy to capture the economic 
                                                            
9By including Bond return and HF distress return as instruments (exclusion restrictions) in the first stage, our 
approach ensures that at least one component of vector Z is a unique determinant of the endogenous variables 
VFStrategy (see for example Guo and Fraser, 2009, section 4.4). Because it is unlikely that there is a firm-level 
characteristic which satisfies the exclusion restriction requirement so that it determines the VFStrategy without 
simultaneously influencing the FSrevaluation outcome, we follow the approach employed by Jiang et al. (2012) 
and choose variables capturing market-wide conditions for distress-investing hedge funds. We repeat the tests 
using S&P500 stock returns instead of bond returns, as in Jiang et al. (2012), and our results do not change.  
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strength of the target firm, measured as the average of the industry-adjusted ratio of operating 
income to sales, in the year before bankruptcy filing (Lim, 2015; Ivashina et al., 2016).  
Vulture funds might also prefer capital intensive firms because their assets are relatively 
easy to value, and can be sold after bankruptcy at higher prices. We include Tangibility pre-
bankruptcy measured as an indicator taking the value of one if the firm’s tangibility (the average 
of plant, property and equipment to total assets in the year before bankruptcy) is above the 
sample median, and zero otherwise.  
The characteristics of the firm’s capital structure are important determinants of both 
fresh start valuations and vulture investment decisions. For example, when a firm has a high 
debt-to-assets ratio, low seniority claims are more likely to fall significantly below the fulcrum 
point. In that case, vulture investors are less likely to purchase LowISeniority claims because 
junior claims risk being cancelled in full. At the same time, there is a greater probability that 
senior debt will be partially impaired in which case holding HighISeniority claims gives more 
upside potential. Debt-to-assets is also a proxy for claimants’ bargaining power (Lehavy, 2002). 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy is the average of the debt-to-assets ratio in the last year before 
filing for bankruptcy. We also consider the proportion of secured bank debt (Secured debt) 
measured as the average ratio of secured bank debt to total assets in the year prior to bankruptcy 
(Jostardndt and Sautner, 2009; Jiang et al. 2012; Franks and Loranth, 2014). As bank lenders 
usually follow a loan-to-loan strategy because their incentives are to enforce existing loans’ 
seniority and security (Heron et al., 2009; Li and Wang, 2016), other senior debt holders have 
less room for activism in the negotiating process. As a result, there is less upside potential from 
pursuing a HighISeniority strategy. High level of secured bank debt suggests that the senior 
debt is more likely to be under-collateralized. The under-collateralized debt gives secured 
creditors incentives to promote the reorganization (instead of liquidation of assets) providing 
more upside potential for junior claimants and hence encouraging a LowISeniority strategy. A 
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large portion of secure debt in the hands of banks also reduces coordination problems 
(Jostardndt and Sautner, 2009). To account for the influence of DIP lenders in the outcomes of 
the reorganization, we add the indicator DIP financing in the second stage of the model (Elayan 
and Meyer, 2001; Bharat et al., 2014; Li and Wang, 2016). Next, we consider the presence of 
large public debt (Public debt is coded as one if a firm has above-median public debt 
outstanding in the year before bankruptcy, and zero otherwise). We build on advances in the 
literature (Lim, 2015) showing that there are often coordination problems among public debt 
holders. In the presence of public debt outstanding, bank lenders, who are generally secured 
and senior to public debt lenders, are reluctant to engage in restructuring efforts or to make 
concessions such as extending maturities and granting new loans. Given vultures’ willingness 
to take junior public debt claims and their superior ability to resolve coordination problems, the 
presence of public debt provides them with an upside opportunity, particularly with a 
LowISeniority strategy. This argument is consistent with the findings of Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1997) and Jiang et al., (2012) of a positive market reaction to the purchase of public 
debt by vulture funds.  
There are other important players in the bankruptcy process, namely hedge funds that 
are not distress-oriented. In general, the presence of hedge funds has favorable effects on 
bankruptcy outcomes (Jiang et al., 2012; Lim, 2015). Their presence as a major equity holder 
is related with more favorable fresh start values, otherwise they would be unlikely to receive 
any payoffs. We include Presence of other hedge funds taking the value of one if at least one 
non-distress hedge fund is an equity holder during bankruptcy, and zero otherwise.10  
                                                            
10 We obtain a list of 584 hedge funds by merging the list kindly provided by Wei Wang (Jiang et al., 2012), the 
Altman-Kuehne (2011) list, and the list from Distressed-Debt-Investing.com. We then search SEC filings 13D, 
13G, 13F, 10K and 8K for each sample firm from six months prior to bankruptcy until exit from bankruptcy, to 
identify the equity holdings by each hedge fund in the list. We also looked for the presence of banks, institutional 
investors, and other funds as equity holders. We found very few cases of holdings by these investors, confirming 
prior findings that these investors stay away from distress firms. 
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Contracting problems and frictions among claimholders affects funds' investment 
decisions and valuation outcomes (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991). We introduce the variable 
Number of claimants - number of claim classes identified in the plan of reorganization to 
represent contracting issues during bankruptcy (Gilson, 1997; Lehavy, 2002; Jiang et al., 2012; 
Lim, 2015).  
We capture senior management’s incentive to cooperate with vulture investors in the 
valuation negotiations by including Management compensation which measures the total 
compensation offered to top managers during bankruptcy scaled by total assets of the 
predecessor firm multiplied by 103. We manually collect the amount of management 
compensation from the companies’ fillings. We also add to the model CEO time at bankruptcy, 
calculated as the log transformation of the number of days the CEO has served in the firm at 
the filing date (Hotchkiss, 1995; Gilson et al., 2000; Lehavy, 2002).  
Since the duration of the restructuring process is related with valuation disagreements 
among claimants (Franks and Torous, 1989), we add Bankruptcy duration defined as the log 
transformation of the number of days between the Chapter 11 filing date and the emerging 
date.11 
 Finally, we capture time and industry variation in reorganizations. Indicator Time is 
coded one if the bankruptcy filing date is in periods of high prevalence of bankruptcies (periods 
2000-2003 and 2009-2010), and zero otherwise. Industry indicators are based on four industry 
groups.12  Table 1 provides definitions of variables.  
 
Place Table 1 here 
                                                            
11 We note that DIP financing, Management pay-to-stay and Bankruptcy duration are not included in the first 
stage of the model because they are granted or known only during and after the reorganization process. Thus, 
they are not ex-ante determinants of vulture funds’ investment decisions. 
12 We aggregate one-digit SIC industry indicators into four industry groups to deal with the small number of 
observations per industry.  
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 VULTURE FUNDS AND FRESH START VALUATION BIAS: DESCRIPTIVE 
EVIDENCE  
Table 2 reports an overview of the first measure of FS valuation bias, i.e. FSrevaluation. We 
split the unscaled FS revaluation measure (successor assets –predecessor assets) into positive 
and negative cases. Firms with positive revaluations (N=62) experience a mean increase of 
$875.16 million, which is mostly achieved through the increase of the fresh start value of 
goodwill and intangibles. Firms with negative revaluations (N=65) show a mean decrease of -
$706.08 million, mainly due to the write-off of PPE and, to a lesser extent, other non-current 
assets.  
Place Table 2 here 
 
As we are interested in how VFStrategy relates to FS valuation bias, we focus on firms with 
vulture funds presence and we split these firms by VFStrategy. In Table 3, we report mean and 
median values for the two measures of FS valuation bias, FSrevaluation (ve – vf) and 
FSmisvaluation (ve – vm,e), for firms in which vultures hold LowISeniority claims and for firms 
in which they hold HighISeniority claims. We find that out of the 21 firms in which vultures 
enter the capital structure at relatively junior positions, 20 firms exit Chapter 11 with positive 
FS revaluation, whereas only 1 firm exits with a negative FS revaluation. In contrast, out of 39 
firms in which vultures purchase senior claims about two-thirds (26) exit Chapter 11 with 
negative FS revaluations.13 The mean and median values of FSrevalution are positive for firms 
with VF holding LowISeniority claims but they are negative for firms with VF holding 
                                                            
13 In the multivariate analysis we repeat our tests excluding the 3 cases where vulture funds hold both types of 
debt claims. Our results do not change. 
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HighISeniority claims, and the difference between the two groups of firms is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. FSmisvaluation is negative for both VF strategies but it is more 
negative when vultures hold high seniority claims and hence prefer lower valuation. This 
descriptive evidence suggests that there is  a link between the relative position of the claims 
that vultures acquire during bankruptcy and the firm’s fresh start value at the exit from 
bankruptcy.  
For completeness, we also report in Panel B of Table 3 the mean and median 
FSrevaluation and FSmisvaluation by vulture fund presence. Mean FSrevaluation is -0.040 for 
firms with vulture fund presence and -0.308 for firms without vulture involvement, a result 
consistent with prior evidence that hedge funds' presence increases recovery rates (Jiang et al., 
2012).14 FSmisvaluation is lower when vulture funds are involved then when they are not but 
the difference is not statistically significant.   
 
Place Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 provides univariate evidence of the link between management compensation during 
bankruptcy and the presence of loan-to-own vulture funds in Chapter 11. Management 
compensation refers to payment schemes, such as KERPs, that are offered to the management 
team to assist the valuation negotiations and help steer the business out of bankruptcy. The 
mean value of Management compensation is more than four times higher in firms with vulture 
fund presence (Panel A). This evidence suggests that management alignment is important 
channel through which vulture investors are able to influence valuation negotiations. Promoting 
                                                            
14 We document a lower proportion of hedge fund involvement (50%) than in prior studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 
2012; Lim, 2015) because we study a particular type of hedge fund (vulture funds). When we consider both 
vulture funds and other hedge funds, we find hedge fund presence in 73% of cases, a proportion similar to that of 
other studies. 
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generous compensation to the agent that is responsible for the estimation of asset values gives 
vulture funds leverage to influence the valuation in their favor. In Panel B of Table 4 we 
examine whether the compensation varies depending on the bargaining power and the 
competition of the negotiating parties15.  We split management compensation into strong and 
weak competition among the claimants (measured as an indicator taking the value of one if 
number of voting classes is above the sample median, and zero otherwise) and find that for the 
cases with vulture presence, Management compensation is significantly higher when the 
competition is weak.  One possible interpretation of this finding is that when the claimants’ 
competition for management influence is weak, the relative bargaining power of an individual 
creditor (i.e., an influential vulture fund) is stronger and they have more  scope to secure 
attractive incentives to mangers that favor their interests.  
Place Table 4 here 
In Table 5 we compare vulture ownership at entry and exit from bankruptcy to see if vultures 
succeed in increasing their share of control rights. Vulture equity holdings increase 
substantially, both in statistical and economic terms. Vulture ownership jumps from 0.7% at 
entry to 17.9% at exit from bankruptcy. For firms in which vultures invested via LowISeniority 
claims, the equity holdings increased from 1.5% to 21.6% on average. For firms where vultures 
acquired HighISeniority claims, average equity holdings increased from 0.3% to 16.7%. These 
findings suggest that both loan-to-own strategies result in a significant increase in control over 
the new firm.  
 
Place Table 5 here 
 
                                                            
15 We thank the editor and the anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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We next provide two examples from our sample firms that illustrate clearly the strategic 
influence of vulture investors on bankruptcy valuations. The first case shows the pivotal role of 
vulture funds holding junior debt in the fresh start value of Six Flags (we identify Tricadia 
Capital Management, 1798 Global Partners, Fortelus Capital Management, and H Partners 
Management LLC as vulture funds).  
“At the centre of a dispute between Six Flags and competing groups of creditors is whether the 
company's current proposed reorganization plan undervalues the company, preventing some creditors 
from getting what they feel they deserve. Over the last 18 months, one of its senior debtholders, Avenue 
Capital Group, has reduced its estimates of how much the company is worth by about $1 billion. Six 
Flags filed Chapter 11 in June with a prepackaged restructuring plan that transferred nearly all of its 
stock to its bank lenders in return for cutting its debt. Since then, two other creditor groups have sought 
to fight for control of the company. An informal bondholders group led by Avenue Capital has proposed 
a plan, now supported by the company that values the company at around $1.5 billion, meaning lower 
tier creditors would only be eligible to recover a 4.8 percent stake in the reorganized company. A group 
of those lower tier creditors, known as the "Stark-led noteholders," asked the court earlier this month 
for permission to file a competing plan of reorganization, saying they have a better proposal that would 
allow them to take more control over the company after bankruptcy…the ad hoc group led by Stark 
included Credit Suisse Securities, Tricadia Capital Management, 1798 Global Partners, Capital 
Ventures International, Altai Capital Management, Pentwater Capital Management, Fortelus Capital 
Management, H Partners Management LLC and Bay Harbour Management LLC.” (Chasan, E. in the 
Reuters News, 4 December 2009). 
 
The second case illustrates how vulture funds holding more senior debt pressure the fresh start 
value of the firm to guarantee the swap of the debt for a share of equity post-bankruptcy (we 
identify Tennenbaum Capital Partners and Bennet Management Corp. as vulture funds).  
“In August, a Bankruptcy Court in New York approved a reorganization plan that trimmed $200 million 
off the company's books through a debt-for-equity swap. Under the plans terms, holders of $305 million 
in secured subordinated notes would receive $75 million of new unsecured notes and 96% of the 
reorganized company's new common stock. After the swap, International Wire's largest shareholder is 
Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC of Santa Monica, Calif., which holds a 25 percent stake. GSC 
Partners Inc. of Florham Park, N.J., and Bennett Management Corp. hold stakes of 16 percent and 14 
percent, respectively, according to a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.” (Beaudette, 
M. in Dow Jones Newswires, 26 August 2004). 
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Table 6 Panel A sets out summary statistics for the variables used in the multivariate analyses. 
The median FSrevaluation is close to zero, which is to be expected since half of the sample 
firms experience a decrease and the other half an increase in fresh start asset values. The average 
FSmisvaluation indicates that FS successor values underestimate market values by 5.5%, a 
number slightly higher than the 4% undervaluation reported by Lehavy (2002). Both the median 
and mean ratios of Debt-to-assets pre-bankruptcy are close to one, higher than the mean and 
median for the Compustat universe, an indication of financial distress and comparable to the 
ratios found in other studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2012). The mean (median) Operating 
performance pre-bankruptcy is -0.144 (-0.041), lower than the mean (median) for the 
Compustat universe and comparable to that found in other papers on Chapter 11 firms. In Panel 
B of Table 6 we present mean values of selected firm characteristics by industry. FSrevaluation 
is more negative in the agriculture and mining sectors, and positive in the services sectors. Table 
7 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients among variables used in the regression models.  
Place Tables 6 and 7 here 
 
4.2 VULTURE FUNDS’ STRATEGIES AND FRESH START VALUATION BIAS  
How does a particular VFStrategy affect FSrevaluation in a complex setting where other factors 
are present? We address this question by estimating the selection model presented in section 3. 
We report the results for the first measure of valuation bias (FSrevaluation) in Table 8 and for 
the second measure (FSmisvaluation) in Table 9. Panels A and B of Table 8 present the results 
from the second and first stage of the FSrevaluation regressions, respectively. The results 
confirm the patterns observed in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 8 show that the 
presence vultures holding  LowISeniority debt instruments has a positive effect on 
FSrevaluation, and that the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, 
moving from a firm with no LowISeniority vulture investor to a firm with LowISeniority vulture 
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investors results in a 1.487 (1.874/1.260) standard deviation increase in FSrevaluation. Activist 
vulture funds risk receiving nothing in the reorganized firm if the fresh start value is too low 
and thus have incentives to influence management estimates of fresh start values upwards to 
the point that their claims are partially (but not fully) impaired.  
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 suggest that HighISeniority strategy is 
significantly related with a downward FSrevaluation, which confirms our prediction that 
vulture funds that acquire claim of HighISeniority vultures have incentives to negotiate lower 
fresh start values so that their claims are partially impaired and swapped for equity. The 
magnitude of the estimates is economically significant: a firm in Chapter 11 with 
HighISeniority vulture investors exits bankruptcy with 1.138 (1.434/1.260) standard deviation 
lower fresh start values than a firm without HighISeniority vulture investors. As an additional 
analysis we decompose the dependent variable FSrevaluation into the three types of asset most 
impacted by fresh start accounting, i.e. ‘FS revaluation of PPE’, ‘FS revaluation of goodwill 
and intangibles’ and ‘FS revaluation other non-current assets’, and re-estimate the model. The 
results (reported in the internet Appendix) are consistent with our main findings in Table 8.   
In columns (2) and (4) we estimate the effect of VF LowISeniority and VF 
HighISeniority conditioned on Management compensation offered during bankruptcy. The 
effect of vulture fund strategy on FS revaluation reinforces with the amount of compensation 
offered to management during bankruptcy. When vultures have incentives to understate fresh 
start values granting managers the average amount of compensation increases the 
understatement by about 2%. On the other hand, when vultures favor overstated fresh start 
values offering the average management compensation enhances overstatement by about 6%. 
Combined with the descriptive evidence in Table 4 these results suggest that management 
compensation is an important channel that vulture investors can use to exert influence over 
bankruptcy valuation. 
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Regarding other factors affecting FSrevaluation, we find that Bankruptcy duration has 
a positive impact but only when vultures hold HighISeniority claims (column 3). This result 
suggests that HighISeniority vultures face strong opposition from claimants that are against 
lower valuations (junior claimants and shareholders), resulting in longer negotiations and 
possibly more amendments to the reorganization plans. Another noteworthy finding is the 
significantly positive effect of Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy across all models, which indicates 
that when leverage is high there is relatively more impaired debt, and that the impaired 
claimants prefer upward FSrevaluation of assets in order to secure the recovery of their claims. 
We find that the Presence of other hedge funds has a significant and positive effect on 
FSrevaluation when vultures hold HighISeniority claims, which is in line with our conjecture 
that other hedge funds are usually unsecured claimholders who favor larger valuations. We also 
find that firms with large levels of Public debt experience lower FSrevaluation. Considering 
that public debt is typically junior and held by a vast number of uncoordinated investors, other 
more powerful players are likely to have incentives to depress the firm value enough to wipe 
out junior public claimants. Number of claimants results in higher FS valuations because 
management and self-interested parties have incentives to overstate the value of the successor 
firm to satisfy a large number of creditors in order to promote the acceptance of the plan. Panel 
B of Table 8 presents the determinants of vulture fund strategy (the first-stage treatment 
equation). Tangibility pre-bankruptcy is an important determinant of the HighISeniority 
strategy  as capital intensive firms  offer the possibility of subsequently selling the assets at 
increased prices. Vulture funds prefer a HighISeniority strategy when Debt to assets is high 
because there is a greater chance that senior claims will be converted into equity (columns 3 
and 4). On the other hand, high leverage means a greater likelihood that junior claims will be 
completely wiped out, making a LowISeniority strategy less appealing (negative and significant 
coefficients in columns 1 and 2). High levels of Public debt (typically junior) encourage vulture 
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funds to buy LowISeniority rather than HighISeniority claims because they are better able to 
solve coordination problems among junior public debtholders. We also find that vulture funds 
are less attracted to a HighISeniority strategy when the Secured (bank) is large which suggests 
that there is less room for senior debt holders’ activism when banks hold large portions of debt. 
On the other hand, vulture funds are more inclined to HighISeniority strategy when other hedge 
funds hold equity positions in the firms. A large number of claimants discourage LowISeniority 
investments. Finally, instrumental variable bond return is positively related to LowISeniority 
and negatively related with HighISeniority. When bond market  conditions are good (measured 
by positive bond returns over the previous three months) distressed-oriented investors are more 
inclined to invest in relatively more junior than in senior claims because the risk of a full 
impairment is lower.16  
Place Table 8 here 
Table 9 reports the regression results for outcome variable FSmisvaluation (ve – vm,e). For 
brevity we report only the second-stage results; the determinants of vulture funds’ investment 
decisions are similar to those presented in Table 8 Panel B.  In line with the FSrevaluation 
results, when vulture funds acquire LowISeniority debt instruments FSmisvaluation tends to 
increase as the fresh start value of assets approximates the market value at emergence date. 
Conversely, when vulture funds holdings are HighISeniority the fresh start value deviates 
further from market value. These findings are consistent with the idea that the valuation bias in 
the fresh start value of the firm is increasing (i.e. greater misstatement) with vulture fund 
involvement in bankruptcy reorganizations. A probable channel used by vulture funds to 
influence the valuation negotiations is the alignment with management interests achieved 
                                                            
16 To account for the possibility that conditions in the bond market are also related to FS asset values, i.e. the 
dependent variable in the second-stage equation, we repeat the tests including Bond return in the second-stage 
equation. The results do not indicate a systematic relation with either FSrevaluation or FSmisvaluation.  
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through compensation schemes. The negative coefficient of Management compensation * 
HighISeniority suggests that the underestimation of fresh start values is greater when managers 
receive generous compensation during bankruptcy negotiations.   
Place Table 9 here 
 
4.3. THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM AFTER BANKRUPTCY: THE WHIPLASH 
EFFECT  
One way of confirming if the FS value has been overly pressured is to examine whether the 
market adjusts the FS value of the firm after it emerges from bankruptcy. If the firm emerges 
from bankruptcy, it would not come as a surprise if future market value exceeds the emergence 
FS value. What would be surprising is to observe that a downward (upward) FS revaluation is 
systematically followed by an increase (decrease) in subsequent market value. These systematic 
reversals in value would suggest that the FS values of assets, which are estimated based on fair 
values, are subsequently found to be incorrect by the market. We refer to the post-bankruptcy 
reversal of value as the whiplash effect. We suggest that the whiplash effect is indicative of FS 
valuation bias. Figure 2 illustrates the definition of the whiplash. The value of the predecessor 
firm at the filing date is ve, the value of the successor firm at emerging date is vf; and the market 
value at period t after bankruptcy is vm,t. For example, the whiplash () occurs when vf  > ve 
(downward FS revaluation) is followed by vm,t  > ve (upward market revaluation). That is:  
       𝜔 ൌ ൫𝑣௙ െ 𝑣௘൯ ൅ ൫𝑣௠,௧ െ 𝑣௘൯      (2) 
 
We compute whiplash () as the sum of the two elements. The first element is the 
negative difference between the successor’s FS value of assets and the predecessor's assets 
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(term (vf - ve)).17 The second element is the difference between the market value of the firm four 
quarters after emergence and the successor’s FS value of (term (vm,t - ve)). The variable is scaled 
by book value of equity plus book value of debt after emergence. 
We re-estimate the model replacing the dependent variable with whiplash and set out 
the results in Table 10.  We find a significant (at the 1% level) downward (upward) post-
emergence market revaluation in the presence of vultures holding LowISeniority 
(HighISeniority) claims. These reversals of the FS value suggest that assets values have been 
biased by LowISeniority (HighISeniority) vultures during bankruptcy. It is possible that vulture 
investors  have strategically influence FS valuation to create the opportunity to earn significant 
returns from subsequent value shifts. For example, vultures could earn high rents by negotiating 
FS values relatively down and then subsequently selling their equity positions at higher market 
values. To control for the fact that the reversal of FS value may result from changes in the firm’s 
performance, we include the variable Operating performance post-emergence (average of the 
ratio of operating income to sales in the first year post-bankruptcy).  
Other noteworthy findings are as follows. Similarly to Table 8, we observe a positive 
relation between Tangibility pre-bankruptcy and whiplash. The whiplash effect decreases with 
the CEO time at bankruptcy which indicates that when the CEO is replaced shortly before 
reorganization negotiations, there is greater fresh start valuation bias (Lehavy, 2002). Number 
of claimants is positively associated with whiplash suggesting that vultures may be able to 
extract higher rents by overcoming coordination problems amongst numerous classes of claims. 
Public debt is negatively associated with whiplash in line with findings in Table 8. The positive 
and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient of Time suggests that there are greater shifts in 
                                                            
17 Note that the first element is equivalent to the negative of the FSrevaluation. 
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subsequent market values for firms that reorganize in periods of high prevalence of 
bankruptcies (bad economic conditions).  
Place Table 10 here 
 
4.4 ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS AFTER BANKRUPTCY 
Given that we argue that vulture funds influence the FS estimates, the reported estimates need 
to be re-assessed and the misstatements corrected when the market value of the assets changes. 
As a result, sooner or later the firm needs to formally amend its accounts. We investigate 
whether the likelihood of a formal restatement increases with the presence of loan-to-own 
vulture investors.  
We collect the data on financial restatement types from Audit Analytics, and we select 
the types that are related to the valuation of assets. For example, we include restatements related 
to balance sheet classification and measurement of assets, irregularities related to measurement 
and recognition of goodwill, and errors with respect to capitalization of expenditures. We 
construct Restatement that takes the value of one if a firm reports an accounting restatement in 
the first year after emerging from bankruptcy due to asset valuation issues, and zero otherwise.  
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that about 40% of the firms report accounting 
restatements related with asset valuation issues in the year after emergence. We re-estimate the 
model employing Restatement as the dependent variable in the second stage and including two 
additional explanatory variables: FS revaluation of intangibles and Loss post-bankruptcy. 
Intangibles are the assets that exhibit the largest FS revaluation (as shown in Table 2), and they 
are generally hard to value because of the uncertainty of the future economic benefits which in 
turn gives rise to measurement errors that might have to be corrected by restatements. Loss-
making firms are more likely to engage in GAAP manipulations that when discovered result in 
formal accounts restatements (Callen et al., 2008). Results reported in Table 10 show that firms 
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in which vultures hold HighISeniority debt are more likely to report an accounting restatement 
after emergence. Combined with the results of FSrevaluation and FSmisvaluation (Tables 8 
and 9), this finding suggests a higher probability of restatements for firms which emerge from 
bankruptcy with depressed FS values. In a setting where conservative accounting practices 
(reflected in relatively low asset values) are considered desirable for investors (e.g., Penman 
and Zhang, 2002), we would not expect firms with relatively low FS values to need to restate 
their accounts almost immediately after bankruptcy unless their FS accounts are unduly 
depressed. This evidence is in support of HighISeniority vultures’ stronger preference for 
depressed FS values that will be corrected in the subsequent accounting restatements.18  
Place Table 9 here 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
This research shows how the fresh start (FS) valuation of assets is an important mechanism in 
the settlements of claims in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Since the fresh start value of assets of the 
new emerging firm are based on management-produced forecasts, there is scope for valuation 
discretion, particularly by claimants with a substantial influence in the bankruptcy negotiations. 
Distress-oriented hedge funds (known as vulture funds) achieve great influence over 
negotiations by purchasing large parts of the partially impaired debt (fulcrum debt) of the 
distressed firm; this is the class of debt that grants maximum voting power in the reorganization 
plan that defines the fresh start value of the firm. We find that vulture fund involvement in 
bankruptcy negotiations is associated  with fresh start valuation bias in a way that strengthens 
their control rights at the exit from bankruptcy. Our findings suggest that when vulture funds 
                                                            
18 In untabulated tests we narrow down the definition of the Restatement variable and code only the restatements 
of the assets most impacted by FS revaluations (PPE, GW and intangibles, other non-current assets).  The 
coefficient on HighISeniority remains positive but the number of restatement cases drops substantially reducing 
the power of the estimations. The coefficient is not statistically significant.  
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acquire debt claims of relatively low seniority in the capital structure of the distressed firm, 
they negotiate for higher fresh start valuations to ensure that their claims are partially rather 
than fully impaired, and hence swapped for equity in the new firm. In contrast, when vulture 
funds acquire debt claims of relatively high seniority they favor lower fresh start value because 
the lower priority debtors then receive little or no share in the equity of the emerging firm, and 
the vulture fund ends up with a larger proportion of the equity. It is possible that these influences 
over fresh start valuations have strategic intentions as they create opportunities for vulture 
investors to gain important control over the new emerging firm and to earn future excess returns. 
Our evidence adds to the debate on whether the large returns that vulture funds earn is de-facto 
evidence of their role in improving the efficiency of court-supervised reorganizations. Our 
study highlights that it should not be assumed that these returns arise simply because of the 
superior management skills that vulture fund members bring to revising the fundamental 
business model of the firm. The returns may also be explained, at least partly, by vulture funds 
having strong incentives to introduce bias into the valuation process of court-supervised 
bankruptcies. One side effect of this potential strategic bias is that predecessor equity holders 
and other interested participants may suffer a considerably disadvantage.   
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Figure 1  
The hierarchy of claims in bankruptcy and pressure over the fresh start value of the firm 
Hierarchy of claims 
 
 
Note:This figure is an adaption and extension of figure 2 in Ivashina et al., (2016). 
 
 
 
  
Secured Debt 
 
Most Senior Unsecured Debt 
 
Level 2 Priority Unsecured Debt 
 
Level 3 Priority Unsecured Debt 
 
Level 4 Priority Unsecured Debt 
 
Subordinated Debt 
 
Common Stock 
Fulcrum Point (FP) 
VF hold claims below FP; 
 Pressure for FS value upwards 
 
 
High 
Intermediate 
Low 
Intermediate 
VF hold claims above FP; 
 Pressure for FS value downwards  
 Successor firm value  
at emergence   
36 
 
Figure 2 
Post-bankruptcy reversal of fresh start value – an example of the Whiplash effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For simplicity the above diagram has been drawn assuming a fixed FS downward revaluation (vf -ve) and a 
varying upward magnitude of market revaluation (vm,t -ve) depending upon the presence of vulture funds. 
In reality the magnitude of (vf -ve) can also vary with vulture fund presence.   
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ve 
Bankruptcy 
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Downward FS revaluation 
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Table 1 - Variable definitions 
FSrevaluation Successor total assets minus predecessor total assets, scaled by book value of 
equity plus book value of debt after emergence of bankruptcy i.e. (ve – vf). 
FSmisvaluation Successor total assets minus market value at emergence of bankruptcy, scaled 
by market value of equity plus book value of debt after emergence of 
bankruptcy i.e. (ve - vm,e). 
VF LowISenority claim Indicator variable coded as one if vulture funds hold debt claims of relatively 
low-intermediate seniority typically junior unsecured debt, and zero otherwise.
VF HighISeniority claim Indicator variable coded as one if vulture funds hold debt claims of relatively 
high- intermediate seniority, typically senior unsecured debt or secured debt, 
and zero otherwise.
DIP financing Indicator variable coded one if the firm has DIP financing, and zero otherwise.
Bankruptcy duration Natural log transformation of the number of days between the Chapter 11 
filing date and emerging date.
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy Industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to sales in the year before 
bankruptcy filing. Industry median is calculated at two-digit SIC level. 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy Average of total debt-to-assets in the year before bankruptcy filing.  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy Indicator variable coded as one if a firm has an average ratio of net plant, 
property and equipment to total assets in the year before filing for bankruptcy 
above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
CEO time at bankruptcy 
 
Natural log transformation of the number of days the CEO has served in the 
firm at bankruptcy filing date. 
Public debt Indicator variable coded as one if the amount of public debt in the year before 
bankruptcy filing is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
Presence of other hedge funds Indicator variable coded as one if at least one non-distress hedge fund is an 
equity holder during bankruptcy, and zero otherwise. 
Secured debt Average ratio of secured bank debt to total assets in the year before 
bankruptcy filing.
Number of claimants Number of claim classes identified in the reorganization plan. 
Time Indicator variable coded as one if the bankruptcy filing date is in periods of 
high prevalence of bankruptcies (2000-2003 and 2009-2010), and zero 
otherwise.
Management compensation  The amount of management compensation granted during bankruptcy to total 
assets multiplied by 10^3. 
HF distress return Monthly average return over the three months before bankruptcy filing of a 
return index of distress-investing hedge funds.
Bond return Monthly average return over the three months before bankruptcy filing of the 
S&P 500 bond returns.
Whiplash - FSrevaluation + (Market value of assets 12 months after emergence - 
Successor total assets); i.e. (vf – ve) + (vm,t - ve). The variable is scaled by book 
value of equity plus book value of debt after bankruptcy. 
Operating performance post-
bankruptcy 
Average of the ratio of operating income to sales in the first year post-
bankruptcy.
Restatement Indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports an accounting restatement in 
the first year after emerging from bankruptcy due to asset valuation issues, and 
zero otherwise.
FS revaluation of intangibles Indicator coded as one if the firm has fresh start adjustments for goodwill and 
intangibles, and zero otherwise.
Loss post-bankruptcy Indicator variable coded as one if the firm has operating losses in the first year 
after emerging from bankruptcy, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2 – Fresh start revaluations by main asset categories (In Million $) 
The table reports mean and median values of main classes of assets at Chapter 11 entry (predecessor firm) and at Chapter 11 exit (fresh start value of assets of the successor firm). 
The sample includes 127 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and applied fresh start valuation.  
  All FS revaluations Positive FS revaluations Negative FS revaluations  
  Predecessor Successor Change Predecessor Successor Change Predecessor Successor Change  
PPE Mean 1,001.474 815.042 -186.433 ** 1,063.429 1,063.701 0.272 942.379 577.859 -364.520 ** 
 Median 282.928 202.971 -5.315 *** 189.383 203.612 0.255 334.291 196.548 -56.118 *** 
GW and intangibles Mean 243.299 655.463 412.164 *** 296.516 1,134.876 838.360 *** 192.538 198.176 5.638  
 Median 24.343 104.464 1.193 *** 57.850 275.554 154.400 *** 4.493 0.000 0.000  
Other noncurrent assets Mean 298.122 226.193 -71.929 ** 151.708 178.602 26.894 437.779 271.588 -166.191 ** 
 Median 47.042 32.078 0.000 ** 49.588 44.036 0.000 42.362 26.027 -3.107 **** 
Total assets Mean 2,867.556 2,933.422 65.865 2,343.528 3,218.694 875.166 3,367.399 2,661.315 -706.083  
  Median 919.867 836.597 -1.388 942.487 1,192.608 185.192 912.510 719.084 -180.589  
Observations = 127    
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Table 3 – Summary statistics of fresh start valuation bias  
The table reports summary statistics of fresh start (FS) revaluation (assets of successor firm - assets of predecessor firm, scaled 
by book value of equity plus book value of debt after bankruptcy) and FS misvaluation (successor value of the firm -market 
value of the firm at emergence, scaled by market value of equity plus book value of debt after bankruptcy).  Panel A shows 
statistics by type of vulture fund (VF) loan-to-own strategy and Panel B reports statistics by presence of vulture fund (Panel 
B). The difference in means (medians) in Panel A is tested using a two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). 
 
Panel A:  Summary statistics by vulture fund strategy 
  
FS revaluation  
(ve – vf)
  FS misvaluation 
(ve - vm,e)
 N Mean Median Nr. 
positive
Nr. 
negative
 N Mean Median 
Firms in which:       
(1) VF hold LowISeniority claims 21 0.269 0.253 20 1  21 -0.076 -0.048
     
(2) VF hold HighISeniority claims 39 -0.196 -0.057 13 26  33 -0.093 -0.115
     
(3) VF hold both LowISeniority and 
HighISeniority claims 3 -0.188 9.000 1 2
 
- - -
      
Test of difference between VF 
strategies (1) - (2): p-value
  
<0.001 0.004
   
0.428
 
<0.001
 
Panel B: Mean and median values by vulture fund involvement 
  FS revaluation (ve – vf) FS misvaluation (ve - vm,e)
 N Mean Median N Mean Median
(1) Firms with vulture fund involvement 63 -0.040 0.009 54 -0.086 -0.094
(2) Firms without vulture fund involvement 64 -0.308 -0.013 47 -0.019 -0.009
   
Test of difference (1) - (2): p-value <0.001 <0.001  0.357 0.049
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Table 4 – Management compensation in bankruptcy and vulture fund involvement 
The table reports summary statistics of management compensation during bankruptcy (amount of compensation to total assets 
multiplied by 103).Panel A shows statistics by vulture fund presence and Panel B reports mean values of management 
compensation for low and high competition among claimants. Strong competition is measured as an indicator taking the value 
of one if the number of voting classes is above the sample median. The difference in means (medians) is tested using a two-
tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). 
 
Panel A: Mean and median values by vulture fund involvement 
  
Management compensation 
in bankruptcy
 Mean Median
(1) Firms with vulture fund involvement 1.498 0.063
(2) Firms without vulture fund involvement 0.344 0.000
 
Test of difference (1) - (2): p-value 0.006 <0.001
 
Panel B: Management compensation and competition among claimants 
 
Weak 
competition 
Strong 
competition
Test of difference 
Strong - Weak: p-value
Firms with vulture fund involvement 2.354 0.616 0.020 
Firms without vulture fund involvement 0.386 0.263 0.656 
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Table 5 – Equity holdings of vulture funds at entry and exit from bankruptcy 
This table compares equity holding at entry and exit from bankruptcy for vulture fund (VF) strategies. The difference in means 
(medians) is tested using a two-tailed t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test).  
 
  
% VF equity holdings 
at bankruptcy entry  
(A) 
 % VF equity holdings 
at bankruptcy exit 
(B) 
Difference in %  VF 
equity holdings at exit 
and entry,  (B) - (A):  
p-value 
Firms in which: Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(1) VF hold LowISeniority claims 0.015 0.000 0.216 0.177 < 0.001 < 0.001
(2) VF hold HighISeniority claims 0.003 0.000 0.167 0.149 < 0.001 < 0.001
(3) VF hold both types of claims 
(LowI and HighI Seniority) 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.074 0.038 0.098 
All firms with VF involvement (N=63) 0.007 0.000 0.179 0.157 < 0.001 < 0.001
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Table 6 – Summary statistics and firm characteristics by industry 
The table reports summary statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses (Panel A), and summary statistics of 
selected firm characteristics by industry (Panel B). The sample includes 127 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy and adopted fresh start accounting (for whiplash the number of observations is 121 and for FS misevaluation 
is 101). Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
  Mean Median St.dev. P25 P75
Fresh Start revaluation (ve – vf) -0.175 -0.002 1.260 -0.221 0.198
Fresh Start misvaluation (ve - vm,e) -0.055 -0.047 0.365 -0.218 0.119
VF LowISeniority claims 0.189 0 0.393 0 0
VF HighISeniority claims 0.331 0 0.472 0 1
DIP financing 0.693 1 0.463 0 1
Bankruptcy duration (years) 1.185 0.889 1.193 0.369 1.622
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.144 -0.041 0.805 -0.112 0.037
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.987 0.843 0.689 0.629 1.122
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.472 0 0.501 0 1
CEO time at bankruptcy (years) 3.502 1.936 4.090 0.553 5.003
Public debt 0.669 1 0.472 0 1
Presence of other hedge funds 0.535 1 0.501 0 1
Secured debt 1.433 0.952 1.826 0.711 1.360
Number of claimants 10.047 9.000 3.956 8.000 11
Time 0.591 1 0.494 0 1
Management compensation 0.917 0 2.368 0 0.561
HF distress return 1.164 1.240 0.965 0.533 1.879
Bond returns 0.630 1 0.485 0 1
Whiplash 0.095 -0.055 1.459 -0.390 0.228
Operating performance post-bankruptcy -2.226 0.093 26.075 0.040 0.124
Restatement 0.394 0 0.491 0 1
FS revaluation of intangibles 0.512 1 0.502 0 1
Loss post-bankruptcy 0.299 0 0.460 0 1
 
Panel B: Mean values of selected firm characteristics by industry 
 Agriculture, 
mining and 
construction 
N=22
Manufacturing 
and 
transportation 
N=67
Retail and 
comm.-
cation 
N=14
Finance and 
other 
services 
N=24 
Fresh Start revaluation (ve – vf) -0.649 -0.113 -0.089 0.037 
Fresh Start misevaluation (ve - vm,e) 0.036 -0.083 -0.038 -0.078 
VF LowISeniority claims 0.182 0.239 0.071 0.125 
VF HighISeniority claims 0.364 0.269 0.429 0.417 
Restatement 0.455 0.373 0.500 0.333 
Bankruptcy duration (years) 0.955 1.344 1.320 0.873 
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.269 -0.164 0.008 -0.060 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 1.103 0.944 0.800 1.110 
Public debt 0.682 0.687 0.714 0.583 
Presence of other hedge funds 0.500 0.567 0.357 0.583 
Number of claimants 9.773 10.075 8.857 10.917 
43 
 
Table 7 – Correlation matrix 
The table reports Pearson correlations of variables for a sample includes of 127 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and adopted fresh start accounting (for whiplash the number of observations is 121 
and for FS misevaluation is 101). Variables are defined in Table 1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Fresh Start revaluation (ve – vf) 1    
(2) Fresh Start misevaluation (ve - vm,e) -0.458 1   
(3) VF LowISeniority claims 0.149 -0.030 1   
(4) VF HighISeniority claims -0.011 -0.045 -0.211 1  
(5) DIP financing 0.002 0.088 0.147 -0.040 1  
(6) Bankruptcy duration (years) 0.110 -0.133 0.139 -0.131 0.140 1  
(7) Operating performance pre-bankruptcy 0.695 -0.433 0.045 0.087 0.085 0.010 1  
(8) Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.099 0.021 -0.042 0.037 -0.160 -0.221 0.059 1  
(9) Tangibility pre-bankruptcy -0.193 0.111 -0.054 0.072 -0.020 -0.096 -0.155 -0.084 1  
(10) CEO time at bankruptcy (years) 0.012 0.054 -0.121 -0.121 0.069 -0.097 -0.005 0.099 -0.032 1  
(11) Public debt -0.053 0.202 0.168 -0.075 0.004 -0.122 0.016 0.186 0.196 0.076 1 
(12) Presence of other hedge funds 0.098 -0.015 0.127 0.051 -0.038 0.188 -0.013 -0.149 -0.036 -0.222 0.050 
(13) Secured debt 0.013 0.083 -0.019 -0.072 -0.122 -0.191 0.000 0.518 0.011 -0.010 0.194 
(14) Number of claimants 0.049 -0.080 0.040 0.034 -0.014 0.276 -0.110 -0.109 -0.031 0.004 0.055 
(15) Time -0.158 0.217 -0.089 0.177 -0.173 -0.292 -0.094 0.137 0.018 0.027 0.164 
(16) Management compensation  0.042 0.008 0.132 0.158 0.160 -0.034 0.043 -0.061 -0.066 -0.057 0.056 
(17) HF distress return 0.196 -0.269 -0.024 0.027 -0.247 -0.048 0.121 0.103 -0.189 0.023 0.081 
(18) Bond returns 0.018 -0.074 0.120 -0.120 -0.157 0.115 -0.113 0.004 -0.091 0.095 -0.019 
(19) Whiplash -0.966 0.375 -0.143 0.002 0.052 -0.101 -0.888 -0.097 0.204 0.024 0.020 
(20) Operating performance post-bankruptcy -0.013 -0.109 0.043 0.064 -0.060 -0.129 0.003 -0.117 0.084 0.042 0.127 
(21) Restatement 0.013 -0.074 -0.019 0.222 0.012 -0.125 0.115 0.143 -0.020 0.100 0.155 
(22) FS revaluation of intangibles 0.262 -0.153 0.150 -0.218 -0.001 0.142 0.104 0.186 -0.054 0.047 0.084 
(23) Loss post-bankruptcy -0.262 0.205 -0.140 0.052 -0.161 -0.114 -0.103 -0.063 0.208 -0.071 0.094 
 
    (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(12) Presence of other hedge funds 1   (13) Secured debt -0.254 1   (14) Number of claimants 0.252 -0.093 1   (15) Time -0.101 0.178 0.144 1   (16) Management compensation -0.007 0.017 -0.129 0.161 1  (17) HF distress return -0.011 0.157 0.066 -0.037 -0.193 1  (18) Bond returns -0.060 0.125 0.009 0.058 -0.002 0.340 1  (19) Whiplash -0.152 0.016 -0.018 0.140 -0.051 -0.174 -0.024 1  (20) Operating performance post-bankruptcy -0.082 0.024 0.115 0.107 0.034 0.175 -0.068 -0.003 1  (21) Restatement -0.090 0.005 0.121 0.212 0.007 0.115 0.017 0.023 -0.110 1  (22) FS revaluation of intangibles -0.025 0.215 0.160 -0.076 0.114 0.178 0.132 -0.247 0.092 -0.084 1  (23) Loss post-bankruptcy 0.023 -0.031 0.018 0.125 -0.026 -0.102 -0.140 0.184 0.056 0.072 -0.119 1 
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Table 8 – Vulture fund strategies and the fresh start revaluation of the firm 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model. Panel A presents coefficients and z-statistics (in parenthesis) 
from the second stage equation estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority 
claims) on fresh start revaluation (dependent variable is FSrevaluation: successor value of assets minus predecessor value of 
assets, i.e. ve – vf ). Panel B reports coefficients and z-statistics from the first stage equation estimating the determinants of the 
vulture fund strategies. Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the year level. The 
symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: The effect on fresh start revaluation: ve – vf  (second-stage equation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
VF LowISeniority claims 1.874*** 1.744***  
 (6.151) (3.620)  VF HighSeniority claims -1.434*** -1.414***
  (-5.191) (-6.058)   DIP financing 0.069 0.035 0.092 0.103
  (0.203) (0.089) (0.516) (0.557)   Bankruptcy duration -0.003 0.050 0.071*** 0.083***
 (-0.059) (0.663) (4.070) (6.666)  Operating performance pre-bankruptcy 0.977 1.060 1.172* 1.167*
  (1.517) (1.555) (1.889) (1.873)   Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.215*** 0.242** 0.299*** 0.300***
 (2.959) (2.300) (17.665) (11.713)  Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.009 -0.002 0.033 0.041*
  (0.071) (-0.021) (1.096) (1.661)   CEO time at bankruptcy 0.005 0.024 -0.006 -0.003
 (0.407) (1.052) (-0.121) (-0.066)  Public debt -0.483*** -0.526** -0.376* -0.355*
  (-2.960) (-2.385) (-1.863) (-1.777)   Presence of other hedge funds 0.122 0.118 0.312** 0.298**
 (0.844) (0.736) (2.476) (2.301)  Secured debt 0.014 0.017 -0.019 -0.015
 (0.826) (0.543) (-1.240) (-1.260)  Number of claimants 0.034*** 0.037** 0.040* 0.043*
 (2.651) (2.535) (1.721) (1.860)  Time -0.105 -0.119 0.056 -0.018
 (-0.359) (-0.953) (0.318) (-0.169)  Management compensation 0.010  0.028**
 (0.574)  (2.168)  Managt. compensation * VFLowISeniority 0.0623**  
  (2.041)     Managt. compensation * VF HighSeniority  -0.023*
   (-1.678)   Constant -1.661*** -1.173*** -0.595*** -0.708***
 (-3.995) (-5.394) (-3.254) (-3.671)Observations 127 127 127 127
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): Chi2 13.246*** 4.022** 14.970*** 20.172***
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Table 8 – Vulture fund strategies and the fresh start revaluation of the firm (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Determinants of vulture fund strategy (first-stage equation) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy 0.636 0.645 1.155* 1.154*
 (1.074) (1.100) (1.742) (1.735)
  Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy -0.170*** -0.167** 0.224*** 0.231***
 (-3.697) (-2.490) (27.213) (17.399)
  Tangibility pre-bankruptcy -0.154 -0.182 0.434*** 0.394***
 (-0.594) (-0.799) (7.840) (11.051)
  CEO time at bankruptcy -0.132*** -0.122** 0.002 0.000
 (-2.622) (-1.971) (0.039) (0.009)
  Public debt 0.878*** 0.803*** -0.444*** -0.411***
 (3.856) (3.086) (-5.785) (-4.375)
  Presence of other hedge funds 0.171 0.201 0.465** 0.465***
 (1.088) (1.276) (2.473) (2.893)
  Secured debt 0.016 -0.007 -0.094*** -0.103***
 (0.405) (-0.252) (-4.113) (-4.754)
  Number of claimants -0.023* -0.025** 0.046 0.042
 (-1.694) (-2.072) (1.461) (1.446)
  Time -0.196 -0.173 0.569*** 0.520***
 (-0.631) (-0.547) (3.684) (8.101)
  HF distress return 0.127 0.113 0.032 0.018
 (0.936) (0.533) (1.109) (0.486)
  Bond return 0.762*** 0.777*** -0.250* -0.220**
 (6.235) (3.351) (-1.873) (-1.988)
  constant -0.655 -0.615 -1.146*** -1.068***
  (-1.368) (-0.972) (-2.680) (-3.366)
Observations 127 127 127 127
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Table 9 - Vulture fund strategies and the fresh start misvaluation ve – vm,e  (second-stage equation) 
The table presents results for the second stage equation of a two stage treatment model estimating the effect of vulture fund 
strategies (VF LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority claims) on fresh start misevaluation (dependent variable is 
FSmisvaluation: successor value of assets minus market value of assets at emergence, i.e. ve – vm,e). Variables are defined in Table 
1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted for group correlation at the year level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VF LowISeniority claims 0.264*** 0.282*  
 (3.017) (1.812)    
VF HighSeniority claims -0.691*** -0.682***
 (-9.603) (-6.089) 
DIP financing 0.078 0.065 0.028 0.037 
 (0.593) (0.447) (0.461) (0.610)  
Bankruptcy duration 0.019 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (1.379) (0.138) (-0.122) (-0.106) 
Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.185*** -0.213*** -0.177*** -0.176***
 (-5.780) (-5.439) (-12.681) (-11.023) 
Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.006 0.009 0.061* 0.056* 
 (0.119) (0.134) (1.835) (1.866)  
Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.094* 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.082***
 (1.722) (4.191) (42.015) (12.853) 
CEO time at bankruptcy 0.034 0.027 0.014 0.012 
 (1.484) (1.113) (1.021) (0.904)  
Public debt 0.057 0.049 0.098*** 0.102***
 (0.830) (0.558) (7.087) (7.588)  
Presence of other hedge funds 0.052 0.053 0.006 0.009 
 (0.936) (0.761) (0.137) (0.175)  
Secured debt 0.015 0.012 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.512) (0.291) (-0.391) (-0.344) 
Number of claimants -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (-2.927) (-5.857) (-0.523) (-0.597) 
Time 0.154*** 0.155*** -0.004 -0.007 
 (3.521) (3.287) (-0.201) (-0.261) 
Management compensation 0.005 0.008***
 (0.387) (40.180) 
Managt. compensation * VF LowISeniority -0.013  
 (-0.166)   
Managt .compensation * VF HighSeniority -0.015***
 (-2.660) 
Constant -0.421*** -0.501*** -0.022 -0.018 
 (-15.777) (-6.281) (-0.101) (-0.106)
 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): Chi2 3.869** 3.686** 379.507** 48.924***
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Table 10 – Market reversal of fresh start revaluation post-bankruptcy – the 
whiplash effect 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model (second stage equation). 
The coefficients and z-statistics are from estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF 
LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority claims) on market reversals of fresh start 
revaluation 12 months after exit from Chapter 11 (dependent variable is Whiplash: - 
FSrevaluation + (MV of assets 12 months after emergence - successor value of assets); i.e. (vf 
– ve) + (vm,t - ve)). Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for group 
correlation at the year level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2)
VF LowISeniority claims -0.377***
 (-3.398) VF HighSeniority claims 0.518***
 (4.247) DIP financing -0.003 -0.012
 (-0.052) (-0.433) Bankruptcy duration -0.157* -0.136
 (-1.652) (-1.358) Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.547 -0.484
 (-1.353) (-1.349) Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy -0.032 -0.000
 (-0.636) (-0.005) Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.299* 0.258***
 (1.814) (2.644) CEO time at bankruptcy -0.069* -0.079**
 (-1.860) (-2.558) Public debt -0.292** -0.311**
 (-2.214) (-2.375) Presence of other hedge funds -0.058 -0.142
 (-0.221) (-0.602) Secured debt -0.007 -0.122***
 (-0.203) (-5.358) Number of claimants 0.039*** 0.042***
 (4.176) (3.947) Time 0.810*** 0.698***
 (6.526) (5.012) Operating performance post-bankruptcy 0.097 0.428
 (0.157) (0.935) Constant 0.041 -0.932
 (0.036) (-1.026)Observations 121 121
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): Chi2 6.292** 3.777**
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Table 11 - Post-bankruptcy accounting restatements 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model (second stage equation). The 
coefficients and z-statistics are from estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF LowISeniority 
claims and VF HighISeniority claims) on accounting restatements (dependent variable is Restatement: 
indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports an accounting restatement due to asset valuation in 
the first year after bankruptcy, and zero otherwise). Variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors 
are adjusted for group correlation at the year level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
  (1) (2)
VF LowISeniority claims -0.223
 (-1.593) VF HighSeniority claims 0.286***
 (6.426) DIP financing -0.002 0.011
 (-0.013) (0.088) Bankruptcy duration -0.055 -0.016
 (-0.638) (-0.331) Operating performance pre-bankruptcy -0.190 -0.061
 (-0.601) (-0.222) Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.125 0.083
 (1.599) (1.079) Tangibility pre-bankruptcy 0.015 -0.060
 (0.127) (-0.499) CEO time at bankruptcy -0.002 -0.008
 (-0.051) (-0.561) Public debt 0.194 0.324***
 (1.139) (3.044) Presence of other hedge funds -0.228 -0.228***
 (-1.643) (-2.987) Secured debt -0.123*** -0.154***
 (-3.383) (-5.473) Number of claimants 0.006 0.019
 (0.298) (0.974) Time 0.133** 0.262***
 (2.061) (5.635) FS revaluation of intangibles 0.123 0.203***
 (0.897) (3.496) Loss post-bankruptcy -0.083 -0.091
 (-0.575) (-0.330) Constant -0.143 -0.345**
 (-0.218) (-2.052)Observations 127 127
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0):Chi2 1.496 3.398**
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Internet Appendix 
 
Fresh start revaluation and vulture fund strategies by type of asset (second equation) 
The table presents estimation results for a two stage treatment model. Panel A presents coefficients and z-statistics (in parenthesis) 
from the second stage equation estimating the effect of vulture fund strategies (VF LowISeniority claims and VF HighISeniority claims) 
on fresh start revaluation for main types of assets (PPE – plant property and equipment, GW&I – goodwill and intangibles, ONCA – 
other non-current assets). Variables are defined in Table 1 of the paper. Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the year 
level. The symbol *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
FS rev. 
PPE 
FS rev. 
PPE
FS rev. 
GW&I.
FS rev. 
GW&I 
FS rev. 
ONCA 
FS rev. 
ONCA
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VF LowISeniority claims 0.846*** 0.243** 0.512***
 (4.362) (2.031) (5.717)    VF HighSeniority claims  -0.754*** -0.477***  -0.476***
   (-5.201) (-3.540)  (-6.316)     DIP financing 0.012 0.007 -0.031* -0.002 -0.097 -0.040
  (0.069) (0.085) (-1.722) (-0.037) (-1.099) (-0.701)     Bankruptcy duration 0.030* 0.039*** 0.032** 0.025*** 0.001 0.018
 (1.657) (6.841) (2.118) (2.648) (0.013) (0.848)    Operating performance pre-
bankruptcy 0.508 0.595** 0.000 0.039*** 0.343 0.396*
  (1.567) (2.037) (0.008) (2.670) (1.579) (1.894)     Debt to assets pre-bankruptcy 0.067 0.103*** 0.124*** 0.161*** 0.009 0.042**
 (1.209) (9.056) (8.029) (16.006) (0.609) (2.351)    Tangibility pre-bankruptcy -0.059 -0.036 0.019 0.061*** 0.025 0.043
  (-1.027) (-1.381) (0.369) (2.643) (1.108) (1.461)     CEO time at bankruptcy -0.019** -0.028 0.003 -0.005 0.011 0.005
 (-2.112) (-1.213) (0.492) (-0.402) (1.122) (0.430)   Public debt -0.298** -0.248* -0.025 -0.049 -0.105*** -0.080
  (-2.183) (-1.795) (-0.638) (-1.262) (-3.207) (-1.565)     Presence of other hedge funds 0.055 0.138*** -0.028 0.011 0.041 0.096
 (0.978) (4.791) (-0.932) (0.592) (0.632) (1.566)   Secured debt 0.018** -0.000 0.003 -0.009* -0.008 -0.017***
 (1.994) (-0.023) (0.807) (-1.904) (-1.270) (-3.218)   Number of claimants 0.015** 0.021 -0.000 0.002 0.010*** 0.013**
 (2.574) (1.283) (-0.040) (0.493) (3.349) (2.498)    Time 0.008 0.035 0.001 0.061 -0.005 0.005
 (0.347) (0.872) (0.011) (1.300) (-0.113) (0.246)    Constant -0.974** -0.355*** -0.216 0.044 -0.626 -0.334
 (-2.460) (-4.347) (-1.568) (0.170) (-1.564) (-1.479)Observations 127 127 127 127 127 127
Wald test of indep. Eqs. (ρ=0)     Chi2 33.801*** 136.257*** 0.506 3.896*** 47.189*** 85.084***
 
 
